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Abstract 
The hypothesis that rapid defense buildups contribute to 
inflation recently has been rejected by Donald F. Vitaliano. In 
this paper, it is argued that this result is misleading, given that 
it is obtained under the implausible assumption of constancy of 
the expected real rate of interest. The hypothesis is reexam-
ined using a well-known measure of the expected inflation 
rate, and it is found that growth of defense spending has a 
statistically significant positive effect on the rate of price 
inflation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists increasingly have become interested in the economic 
consequences of military spending. Most early analysis took place in the 
1970s [5, 7, 9, and 11]. The acceleration of defense expenditures in the 
1980s has led to significant additional research in this area [2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 
and 13]; a variety of propositions has been offered and subjected to empiri-
cal tests. A popular contention that recently has been tested by Vitaliano 
[13] is that defense spending has a discernible influence on the rate of infla-
tion. His results indicate that "there appears to be no perceptible impact on 
the rate of price inflation separably attributable to defense spending" [13]. 
This paper argues that this conclusion is reached using an empirical 
model that is misspecified. A remedy for this problem is offered, and the 
resulting model is used to reexamine the defense sl:>ending-inflation hypoth-
esis. The results indicate that there is a statistically significant I:>ositive 
relation from the growth rate of defense spending to the rate of inflation. 
"'The author would like to thank Donald F. Vitaliano for comments on 
an earlier version of this paper and the referees of the Quarterly Journal of 
Business and Economics for their numerous constructive suggestions. Any 
remaining error is the author's. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The effect of defense spending on the general price level can be 
transmitted through changes in aggregate demand and/or aggregate supply. 
On the demand side, rapid defense buildups contribute to acceleration of 
nominal demand growth that will affect inflation adversely if not offset by 
tax increases or monetary growth reductions. In this respect, the demand 
side effect of increased defense spending is no different from that of other 
government expenditures (12). 
On the supply side, expansive defense outlays can contribute to infla-
tion if they are confronted with supply inelasticities or capacity limitations 
in the narrow-based defense industry [2, 12). Further, to the extent that 
the defense industry and the market for Skilled labor on which it relies are 
characterized by monopolistic and/or monopsonistic pricing practices, 
defense buildups bring price increases in these markets that spread to the 
rest of the economy, as well as entering the price index directly [13]. Thus, 
for given demand pressure and inflation expectations, defense spending has a 
potential supply side effect on the rate of price inflation similar to the 
effect of the oil price shocks of the 1970s (2). 
It should be noted that what matters is the speed of increase in defense 
expenditures, not the level of these outlays (12). A related factor is the 
timing of the planned buildups with respect to the space of time over which 
the objectives of the buildups are to be realized and whether this coincides 
with a period when the defense industry is operating at or near full capacity. 
The defense spending-inflation rate hypothesis has been tested by 
Vitaliano using Gordon's (6) model of inflation. Vitaliano measures the 
inflation rate, p, in terms of the quarterly rate of change of the GNP defla-
tor, specifies demand pressure as the natural logarithm of the ratio of actual 
to natural unemployment rate, In(u/u*), and captures supply shocks, S, using 
a dummy variable for the 1973 to 1974 OPEC oil price increase. In his 
analysis, Vitaliano assumes a constant expected real rate of interest, re, and 
uses the average of the nominal yield on three and five year U.S. government 
bonds, i, as a proxy for the expected inflation rate, pe. 
To this model, Vitaliano adds alternative measures of defense spending, 
D, as separate explanatory variables. The specific measures he uses are the 
quarterly rate of growth of nominal defense spending, GRD, the ratio of 
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nominal defense spending to nominal GNP, D/GNP, and the growth rate of 
this ratio, GRDGNP. Thus, Vitaliano's model is [13]: 
where pe = i, and e is the random disturbance term. 
A priori, al is expected to be unity since an increase in pe represents 
an upward shift in the short-run Phillips curve along a vertical long-run 
Phillips curve, increasing p proportionately. Further, a2 is expected to be 
negative because an increase in u relative to u* represents a reduction in 
nominal demand growth, reducing p. On the other hand, a3 is expected to be 
positive because an unfavorable supply shock shifts the short-run Phillips 
curve up, increasing p. Finally, because Vitaliano assumes a constant 
expected real rate of interest, it is omitted from the model and left to the 
intercept term. Thus, aO is expected to equal the negative of reo 
Vitaliano estimates several versions of this model that differ with 
respect to the specification of the defense spending variable and the lag 
assumed by the demand pressure and/or growth of defense spending (no lags 
versus a two quarter lag). His results indicate that defense spending has no 
statistically significant effect on the rate of inflation. 
The most troublesome aspect of Vitaliano's work is his use of the 
nominal rate of interest as a proxy for the expected inflation rate. This 
causes an error-in-variable bias (i.e., bias due to misspecification of explana-
tory variables) if the expected real rate is not constant. l In this case, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators will be biased and inconsistent, and 
lNote that the primary problem is not whether re has a homoskedastic 
variance, but whether it has a nonzero variance. The former problem is not 
usually expected in time series samples. 
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the classical test of hypothesis produces misleading results2• Even if the 
model did not suffer from this problem, the estimates still would be biased 
and inconsistent due to the simultaneous equation bias that results from the 
interaction between inflation and the nominal interest rate. 
It is hard to believe that the expected real rate of interest has been 
constant over more than two decades of structural change, especially in the 
1970s. It is true that in the 1960s both nominal interest rates and inflation 
expectations were generally stable. But in the 1970s, while nominal interest 
rates remained relatively stable, inflation expectations became volatile. In 
the 1980s, this pattern has been reversed; nominal interest rates have 
become volatile ~nd inflation expectations have reached relative stability. 
In order to examine the behavior of the real component of the measure 
of the nominal interest rate used by Yitaliano, one has to estimate the 
expected rate of inflation. For this purpose, an approach suggested by Barro 
[1] and Gordon [6] 3 is used. According to the estimates over the sample 
period, the hypothesis that the variance of the expected real rate is not 
different from zero cannot be accepted. Further, separate tests of equality 
of means and variances of the expected real rate before and after the first 
quarter of 1970 indicate that neither hypotheses can be accepted. These 
observations lead to the conclusion that the expected real rate of interest 
has not been constant over the sample period, and therefore a reexamination 
of the defense spending -inflation rate hypothesis is warranted. 
2Yitaliano [13] clearly is aware of the problems associated with a 
nonconstant expected real rate of interest. He chooses to use the nominal 
rate of interest as a proxy for expected inflation because " ••• regressing the 
inflation rate on past values of itself poses serious serial correlation 
problems that could produce inconsistent and biased estimators ••• " As 
indicated below (footnote 4), this problem can be avoided if one uses an 
estimation procedure suggested by Barro [1] and Gordon [6]. 
3This rate was estimated using a second order Almon polynomial with 
and without right endpoint constraint and a purely distributed-lag model. 
Following Gordon [6], in each case a dummy variable was included for the 
Nixon wage-price controls but then used its estimated coefficient to add the 
effect of the controls to the predicted values of the regressand. The 
maximum length of lag was kept at twenty quarters as suggested by 
Gordon. The results were generally consistent across all three 
specifications; in no case could the hypothesis of zero variance of the 
expected real rate be accepted. 
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III. THE MILITARY SPENDING-INFLATION HYPOTHESIS REEXAMINED 
This section incorporates the measure of the expected inflation rate 
into Gordon's model, and the defense spending-inflation hypothesis is 
reexamined.4 In order to facilitate comparisons with the results reported by 
Vitaliano, all other variables are specified as he did, using the same nota-
tions, data sources, and sample period of all seven equations he uses are 
estimated.5 The results are reported in Table I. 
The results are analyzed by first considering the determinants of 
inflation suggested by Gordon. In all seven equations, the parameter esti-
mate of the expected inflation rate has the expected positive sign and is 
statistically significantly different from zero. Further, in no equation is this 
estimate statistically significantly different from unity (in decimal terms), 
thus satisfying the restriction imposed on it by the underlying theory. 
Turning to the demand pressure variable, it is observed that in all 
equations the parameter estimate of this variable has the expected negative 
sign and is statistically significant. This is different from Vitaliano's results; 
in his first six equations this important variable is insignificant at the con-
ventional levels. Regarding the supply shock variable, the results indicate 
that in all equations it is positive and statistically significant, as suggested 
by theory. 
The defense spending variable is considered next. First, observe that 
any contemporaneous measure of defense spending that is specified in 
growth form is positive and statistically significant at least at the ten per-
4 A conceptual and an econometric feature of the approach used for 
estimating the expected real rate should be pointed out. Conceptually, it is 
based on the notion that expectations are formed rationally, but with 
imperfect information [1]. Econometrically, this approach has an advantage 
for a model of inflation in that the resulting anticipated inflation rate acts 
as an instrumental variable upon entering the model. As a result, there is no 
reason to believe that this measure is correlated with the error term 
of the model, so that its use need not yield biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates. 
5While Vitaliano [13] uses the data from the second edition of 
Gordon's text, this work uses the data reported in the third edition. 
Although there are some differences between the two series, they appear to 
be too minor to affect the results presented here. 
61 
TABLE I 
Quarterly Estimates of Inflation Equations 
1955:1 to 1979:2 
(t-ratios in Parentheses) 
Independent 
Variables 2 4 7 
GRD 0.00035 0.00038 
(2.58) (2.87) 
GRD_2 -0.00002 0.00001 
(-0.12) (0.07) 
DGNP 
-0.17 
(-1.06) 
GRDGNP 0.0002 0.0002 (1.58) (1.61) 
In(u/u*) 
-0.0145 
-0.0152 
-0.0163 
-0.0188 (-2.77) (-2.87) (-2.99) (-3.13) 
In(u/u*L2 
-0.0140 
-0.0144 
-0.0135 (-2.75) (-2.66) (-2.55) 
pe 0.0098 0.0096 0.0100 0.0099 0.0097 0.0097 0.0090 (17.00) (16.99) (17.18) (16.58) (16.26) (16.82) (8.50) 
S 0.0174 0.0175 0.0171 0.0169 0.0173 0.0173 0.0162 (4.13) (4.13) (4.00) (3.83) (3.85) (3.97) (3.61) 
Constant 
-0.0042 -0.0034 
-0.0027 
-0.0032 -0.0020 
-0.0016 1.28 (-1.43) (-1.19) (-0.93) (-1.08) (-0.68) (-0.54) (0.84) 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 
F Statistic 69.42 69.39 65.11 62.52 60.99 63.64 63.55 
Rho 
-0.22 -6.22 
-0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 
-0.21 (-2.04) (-1.97) (-2.18) (-2.19) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-1.87) 
D-W Statistic 2.01 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.03 2.01 2.02 
Notes: 
1) All equations were estimated USing Cochran~rcutt first order autoregressive proce-
dure with maximum IIkellhood estimate of Rho. 
2) All estimates are expressed In decimal terms. 
3. All quarterly growth rates have been annualized. 
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cent level using a one-tailed test (equations 1, 2, 3, and 6). In particular, 
regardless of the specification of the demand pressure variable (no lags 
versus a two quarter lag), the contemporaneous growth rate of nominal 
defense spending (GRD) is positive and significant at the five percent level 
or better (equations 1 and 2).6 In equations 3 and 6, however, the growth 
rate of the ratio of nominal defense expenditure to nominal GNP (GRDGNP), 
while positive, is significant only at the ten percent level. This variable is 
never significant in Vitaliano's model. 
According to equations 4 and 5, the two quarter lagged value of the 
growth rate of defense spending has no statistically significant impact on the 
inflation rate. Other lag structures for this variable yielded similar insignif-
icant results. This, coupled with the fact that the contemporaneous growth 
rate of nominal defense expenditures has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient, implies that rapid defense buildups exert only a transitory effect upon 
the inflation rate. 
According to equation 7, the ratio of nominal defense expenditures to 
nominal GNP is negative, but not statistically significant at reasonable 
levels. This represents another dissimilarity between the present results and 
those reported by Vitaliano, given that he finds this variable to be significant 
at the ten percent level. In any case, this variable is not crucial for the 
hypothesis since, as noted above, what matters is the rapidity of defense 
spending.7 
6 An anonymous referee pointed out that the proper way of expressing 
the defense spending variable, GRD, is to measure it in real terms. Vitaliano 
does not address this issue. Equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 were reestimated using 
the quarterly growth rate of real defense expenditures. In equations 1 and 2, 
this variable turned out to be positive and statistically significant at the ten 
and five percent levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test. As expected, 
the parameter estimate of this variable was smaller than that of the 
corresponding variable measured in nominal terms. Further, in equations 4 
and 5, as in the case of nominal defense expenditures, the two quarter lagged 
growth rate of real defense expenditures was not statistically significant. 
7Vitaliano, who noted this fact, inclUded this ratio in his model 
"because the national debate is cast in terms of the relative share of GNP 
devoted to defense," [131. 
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An interesting question that arises is whether the above findings would 
hold if the sample period were extended to include the 1980s, a period in 
which the infiation rate declined significantly even though defense spending 
accelerated. In order to examine this issue, all equations were reestimated 
over the period 1955:1 to 1983:2.8 In addition to the dummy variable indi-
cating the 1973 to 1974 OPEC oil price increase, S, (which is now denoted 
S1') a second dummy variable, S2' representing the oil price supply shock of 
1979 to 1980 that fOllowed the revolution in Iran was included also. The 
results are reported in Table II. 
As is evident from these results, the traditional determinants of infia-
tion have the expected signs and are significant in all seven equations. It 
also is observed that, as before, the coefficient of the contemporaneous 
growth rate of nominal defense spending (equations 1 and 2) is positive and 
significant at the five percent level and has a magnitude similar to that in 
Table I. Further, the two quarter lagged value of this variable is insignifi-
cant (equations 4 and 5). All of these results are consistent with those 
reported in Table I. There are some differences, however, between the two 
sets of results with respect to the statistical significance of the ratio of 
defense expenditures to GNP and the growth rate of this variable. While this 
ratio remains negative, it is now significant (equation 7). The growth rate of 
this ratio, however, is no longer significant at any level (equations 4 and 5). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The model used here and that employed by Vitaliano lead to different 
conclusions with respect to the effect of growth of defense expenditures on 
the infiation rate. The results reported in this paper indicate that rapid 
defense buildups have an adverse effect on the rate of price infiation that 
appears to be transitory. 
Since all other factors are common between the two models, the 
difference in the conclusions is attributable to the different measures of the 
expected infiation rate. In view of the problems associated with using 
nominal interest rates as a proxy for the expected infiation rate, the results 
from the present model seem to be more reliable. 
8The longer sample period ends with the second quarter of 1983 due to 
the unavailability of data on the natural rate of unemployment used for 
constructing the demand-pressure variable. 
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TABLE n 
Quarterly Estimates of Inflation Equations 
1955:1 to 1983:2 
(t-ratios in parentheses) 
Independent 
Variables 4 7 
GRD 0.0003 0.0003 
(2.25) (2.38) 
GRD_2 -0.00004 -0.00004 (-0.32) -(0.27) 
DGNP -0.29 
(-Z.05) 
GRDGNP 0.0001 0.00009 
(0.79) (0.69) 
In(u/u*) -0.0126 -0.0125 -0.0122 -0.0166 
(-2.72) (-2.6S) (-a.64) (-3.23) 
In(u/u*L2 -0.0110 -0.0099 -0.0100 
(-2.28) (-2.04) (-2.05) 
pe 0.0096 0.0093 0.0098 0.0098 0.0095 0.0095 0.0084 
(15.73) (15.37) (16.0a) (15.73) (15.30) (15.58) (9.43) 
81 0.0189 0.0195 0.0184 0.0179 0.0187 0.0192 0.0159 (4.25) (4.29) (4.11) (3.93) (4.00) (4.15) (3.44) 
82 0.0109 0.0111 0.0120 0.0127 0.0131 0.0125 0.0113 (2.31) (2.28) (2.52) (2.72) (2.72) (2.54) (2.40) 
Constant -0.0030 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0243 
(-0.99) (-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.74) (-0.28) (-0.19) (1.85) 
R:2 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.76 
F Statistic 62.91 61.36 59.28 58.86 56.89 57.21 62.17 
Rho -0.24 -0.21 -0.26 -0.27 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 
(-2.36) (-2.09) (-2.55) (-2.66) (-2.39) (-2.27) (-2.29) 
D-W Statistic 2.04 2.02 2.06 2.07 2.05 2.04 2.06 
Notes: 
1l All equations were estimated using CochranlM>rcutt first order autoregressive proce-
dure with maximum likelihood estimate of Rho. 
2) All estimates are expressed in decimal terms. 
3) All quarterly growth rates have been annualized 
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